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Abstract
The first modern futures market is said to date back to the Chicago Board of Trade
established in 1848. However, there existed an older precedent; the Dojima Rice Market
established in 1730 in Osaka. The past literature on Dojima has made it clear that
Dojima had well-established trading systems. However, a important question remains
unanswered: whether the first well-established futures market efficient or not? This
paper first constructs the daily price index from the original historical document, and
applies the test of unbiasedness hypothesis and the classic measure of market efficiency;
“weak-form efficiency” to Dojima Rice Market, and shows that there existed these types
of efficiency.
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I. Introduction
The first modern futures market is said to date back to the Chicago Board of Trade es-
tablished in 1848. However, there existed an older precedent; the Dojima Rice Market
established in 1730 in Osaka, and closed in 1869 due to the collapse of Tokugawa Shogu-
nate. Many works on the Dojima rice market (henceforth referred to as Dojima) have been
published in Japan during the past 70 years. The past literature on Dojima has made it
clear that Dojima had well-established trading systems. However, a important question
remains unanswered: whether the world first well-established futures market of Dojima effi-
cient or not? Whether the efficient market indeed existed or not is still to be inquired with
empirically verifying the efficiency of Dojima.
Actually, Ito (1993) andWakita (2001) had examined the efficiency of Dojima by applying
the test of the unbiasedness hypothesis (UBH) to Dojima. Ito (1993) concluded that, from
1763 to 1780, Dojima failed to satisfy the unbiasedness condition, and that Dojima was not
the efficient market. On the other hand, Wakita (2001) applied the same test to each month
of the year from 1760 to 1864, and concluded that the UBH cannot be rejected for at least
six months of the year, while he rejected the hypothesis for all months when applied to the
year from 1830 to 1864. These previous analyses indicate that Dojima should probably be
recognized as inefficient or marginally efficient market—the first well-established market in
the world might not have offered competitive trade opportunities.
These two pioneering literature shed light on the quantitative aspects of Dojima by econo-
metric instruments. However, we can not necessarily conclude that Dojima was inefficient or
marginally efficient. For instance, there was a contemporary witness to Dojima’s efficiency;
Futures trades’ virtue lies in the fact that it is, unlike spot trades, robust
against temporal economic shocks. Hence, it naturally allows traders to freely
pursue their own benefits, and it would be unaffected by hoarding or dumping.
Rather, prices are fixed on the basis of the interaction of among all traders’
intention. In particular, the price fixed in this system is much less biased than
those fixed in the spot market. The price at the futures market is a mirror of
the economic conditions of local regions, from which we can know their general
economic circumstances1.
This description was presumably written in late 18th century or later, the period covered
by Ito (1993) and Wakita (2001). According to the description quoted above, the futures
prices at Dojima were regarded as more informative than the spot prices. In other words,
the traders in Dojima at that time considered its unbiasedness and thus its virtue of the
futures trades.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the difference of the understandings between
Ito (1993) and Wakita (2001), and the contemporary observation. Owing the empirical
framework to these two previous works, this paper deal with three points: we should (i)
construct the daily price index from the original historical document, and (ii) reexamine the
1“Rosei-hiroku”, cited by Shimamoto, ed (1970), p10
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UBH in Dojima, and (iii) employ the classic measure of market efficiency proposed by Fama
(1970) to capture the efficiency of Dojima.
The daily price index is necessary because the existing monthly or yearly price indices
are not suitable for the purpose of this paper, especially in terms of the frequency and the
length of the period covered. The price index on which Ito (1993) relied covers the period
from 1763 to 1780. As Ito himself recognized, the period covered here is only a fraction
of the whole history of Dojima. On the other hand, the monthly price index presented by
Tsuruoka (1972) (henceforth referred to as Tsuruoka Index), on which Wakita (2001) relied,
covers the sufficiently long period. However, this price index contains considerable number
of wrong figures, and the prices in the period from 1819 to 1827 are not the prices at Dojima,
but at another market.
Hence, the conclusions reached by Ito (1993) and Wakita (2001) could have been affected
by the problem with these price indices, and can not be considered to represent the efficiency
of Dojima appropriately. Hence, we should construct the sufficiently long, reliable, and high-
frequency price index, and reexamine the UBH in Dojima. Based on newly constructed price
index, this paper shows that Dojima satisfied the unbiasedness conditions in the period from
1798 to 1835.
Finally examined is the classic measure of market efficiency, which was proposed by Fama
(1970). One of these criteria is “weak-form efficiency2.” This paper applies this criterion both
to the spot and the futures market, and shows that both markets had this type of efficiency.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II introduces the institutional aspects of
Dojima, which serves as background for subsequent discussions. Section III reviews the daily
price index which was newly constructed, and reexamines the UBH in Dojima. Section IV
lays out the model for capturing the weak-form efficiency, and presents an empirical analysis,
followed by the concluding remarks.
II. Institutional Aspects of Dojima
Trades in Dojima
This subsection provides a minimum background that is necessary for subsequent analysis3.
In the Tokugawa era, feudal lords collected the rice in kind as tax, and shipped it to the
market (mainly Osaka) for financing their local government budget. They stored the rice in
their warehouses and sold at the auction where officially authorized rice brokers bid. Rice
brokers who made a successful bid received the rice bills which, per unit, was worth 1500kg
real rice stored in the warehouses4. The rice brokers in principle could have submitted their
rice bills to the warehouse and received real rice in exchange. However, they mainly sold the
bills in the secondary market; the Dojima rice market. Thus, the spot market at Dojima
should be regarded as the exchange market of rice bills, not of real rice.
2A more detailed definition of this criterion is described in section IV.
3See Miyamoto (1988) and Schaede (1989) for further institutional descriptions of Dojima.
4In the late 17th century, each rice bill corresponded to a particular set of rice that the broker won at the
auction. In late times, this correspondence gradually collapsed and rice bills came to take on the character
of securities. See, Shimamoto (1960).
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In this spot market, the rice bills were required to be delivered in exchange for cash
within four days after the transaction. Because of this shortness in delivery time, the spot
market was regarded as the market for real demand, not for speculation. While the traders
who could join in the market were limited to officially authorized rice brokers, anybody who
paid some amount of fee to the authorized traders could join in the market. However, more
traders joined in the futures market which was useful for speculation.
In Dojima, there were about 30 kinds of rice bills issued by feudal lords’ warehouses,
and the traders’ association choose one rice bill among those 30 rice bills as the standard
rice. This standard rice was exactly the underlying asset for futures trade. Like the spot
market, the traders in this market were formally limited to officially authorized members.
However, any traders could actually join the market by paying a little amount of fee to the
authorized traders. The fee associated with the futures trades was less than that of the spot
trades. In addition, amount of cash needed in the futures market was relatively smaller than
that in the spot market. These features of the futures market had attracted many traders,
especially speculators.
In principle, the futures market traders had to close their positions by buying back or
selling back before the maturity date. For example, a trader who made a long position
during the trading period must close his position until the maturity date by selling same
amount of the contract. The settlement by delivery was permitted in the maturity date,
while a constraint designated by Tokugawa Shogunate was imposed. That is, in Dojima,
the allowed amount of the settlement by delivery was strictly limited to the fixed level; 1000
rice bills for the whole market. Under this constraint, the traders in Dojima traded the rice
bills thorough the futures market. Usually, net settlements were the dominant method of
the settlement. These features indicate that the futures trades at Dojima was designed not
for the real demand, but for the speculation.
Trading season
Both the spot and the futures market have three separate trading seasons: January 4–April
27(28), May 7–October 8 (9), and October 17–December 23 (24)5. These seasons were called
spring market, summer market, and winter market, respectively. The markets were closed
for about 10 days between any of the two trading seasons. Every time the trading season
started, the futures market committee were supposed to re-select the standard rice, it was
usually the case that the standard rice was selected from Big five lords’ warehouses6.
Trade practices
Trading began at 8 a.m. in the futures market, followed by the spot trading which began
at 10 a.m. Both trading began with opening price presented by the board members of
Dojima. In the futures market, the opening price was determined by the closing price of the
previous day. On the other hand, the opening price in the spot market was determined by
5The dates in parentheses are those for the spot market.
6That is, Kaga, Chikuzen, Chugoku, Higo, Hiroshima. Each was regarded as satisfying the condition,
namely credibility and liquidity.
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two factors; the closing price in the previous day and the price movements of the futures
market preceding the spot market. This lead-lag relationship implies that the prices at the
futures market were regarded as more informative than the spot market.
In both markets, the price was fixed by an oral auction. Traders in the circuit shout the
price with gestures which stand for either “ask” or “bid”. There were no market makers like
them at Nasdaq, and hence the price was fixed only when the ask price and the bid price
matched with each other. Every time a trading deal was established, the clerk of Dojima
beat out the wood stick and shouted the price. The trading records were not written down
until the completion of the trade in a day. After the trade was closed, the traders submitted
the record to the clearing house. The clearing house checked each traders’ transaction and
canceled out his buying and selling. Finally, each traders’ remaining position was kept in
the record.
The spot market closed around the noon. On the other hand, the futures trade had a
one-hour recess at noon and continued the trading until around 2 p.m. The closing price of
the futures market was fixed by a special method. First, the clerk put fire on the fuse cord.
The traders were allowed to trade until the fire extinguished. The closing price of the day
was determined by the price at the moment the fire went out.
Now we understand the outline of the trading activities at Dojima. Table 1 presents the
summary of above descriptions. Based on this, the empirical analysis is conducted in the
following sections.
III. The test of the unbiasedness hypothesis
The unbiasedness hypothesis
In this section, the unbiasedness hypothesis, which had been tested by Ito (1993) and Wakita
(2001), is reexamined. Before the empirical analysis, the concept of UBH and the previous
works should be introduced. The UBH itself is based on two assumptions; risk neutrality
and rationality. If the futures market speculators are neutral to risks, and if they use all
available information rationally, the current futures price must equal the spot price expected
to be reached at the maturity date. This relationship is expressed as
Ft−1 = Et−1 [St] , (1)
where the St is the spot price at time t, the Ft−1 is the value of a futures contract at time t−1,
which expires at time t. The Et−1 is the expectations operator conditional on information
available at time t− 1. A simple UBH test is provided by a linear regression model as
St = α + βFt−1 + ut. (2)
The condition for unbiasedness is that α = 0, β = 1, and the ut should be serially uncorre-
lated. If this holds, then the futures prices are thought to be unbiased predictors of the spot
prices in the future. In other words, the speculators in the market can use all the available
information to make a rational expectation. Abovementioned historical description indeed
implies that this held in Dojima at that time.
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Based on this concept, Ito (1993) and Wakita (2001) had conducted the empirical anal-
ysis. The model used in Ito (1993) was almost same with the model (2); That is,
lnSCt − lnSOt = α+ β(lnFCt − lnSOt) + et, (3)
where the SOt and the SCt indicate the spot prices in the beginning and the end of the
trading period t respectively, and F indicates the futures prices. Based on this model, Ito
(1993) ran the regressions and concluding that, in the period from 1763 to 1780, Dojima
failed to satisfy the unbiasedness condition.
The results by Ito (1993) can not be accepted as one to evaluate the efficiency of Dojima
appropriately, because Ito (1993) focused on very small part of Dojima’s history.7.
On the other hand, the model in Wakita (2001) is;
lnS = α + β lnF + εt, (4)
where the S is the spot price at the beginning of April, September, and December, and the
F is the futures price. Tsuruoka index on which Wakita (2001) relied, covers the sufficiently
long period, but contains only prices at the beginning of each month. It is the reason
why Wakita (2001) had to use prices at the beginning of the month as proxies of prices at
maturity dates, which were not prices at maturity dates. In addition, it should be noted
that Tsuruoka index contains considerable number of wrong figures, and the prices in the
period from 1819 to 1827 are not the prices at Dojima, but at another market. Therefore,
the results by Wakita (2001) had also been restricted by the property of the price index8.
Based on above discussion, it can be said that whether the UBH does hold in Dojima
remains to be unanswered. The reexamination based on newly constructed price index is
thus called for.
The price index
To overcome the problems with the existing price indices, we should newly construct the
more reliable and highly frequent price index from the original historical documents. Our
new price index is provided by “Yorozu souba nikki (Daily memorandum of commodity price
indices9)” This memorandum was written by the contemporary rice merchant who dealt in
7It is because the price index on which Ito (1993) relied just covers the period from 1763 to 1780.
8Another problem is that Wakita (2001) did not mention about the time sequence of the independent
variables; the futures prices. Wakita (2001) indicated the test results in each month, that is, 12 results
within a year, however, it is not clear how can we interpret the results in April, September, and December
when each trading season was closed. Taking the spring market for example, if the regression was conducted
between the prices both in the April, then it is not the test of UBH, rather it is the test of the arbitrage
condition. In turn, if the regression was conducted between the prices of the spot market in September and
the prices of the futures market in April, then it is not consistent with real trading practices in Dojima,
because the “standard price” in the spring market and that of the summer market is not the same, and “roll
over” across the trading seasons was prohibited in Dojima. In addition, it should be noted that the summer
market was closed in October, not in September, and there exists no available price index in the period from
1830 to 1833.
9Actually, the Tsuruoka index was also constructed from this memorandum. In the process of newly
constructing daily price index, the author found that the Tsuruoka index contains considerable numbers of
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the rice and the fertilizer. This merchant joined Dojima futures market for speculation,
and for this reason, he recorded the commodity price indices on his memorandum. From
this memorandum, we can construct the daily price index both in the futures and the spot
market during the period from 1798 to 1856.
In addition to this, there exists another price index provided by Suzuki (1935). This
index covers the period from 1834 to 1864, and also contains both the futures prices and the
spot prices10. The price index, consisted of these two indices, allow us to cover the period
from 1798 to 1864.
Reexamination of the UBH
Now we conduct the empirical analysis. The model used in this paper can be expressed as
follows;
SCt = α+ βFOt + ut, (5)
where the SCt is the spot price in the maturity date of the trading season t, the FO indicates
the futures prices in the beginning of the trading season. The condition for unbiasedness is
that α = 0, β = 1, and ut should be serially uncorrelated.
The test results are summarized in Table 2. As Table 2 indicates, the UBH in the whole
period is rejected at 1 % significance level. On the other hand, in the period from 1798 to
1835, the UBH is not rejected at 1 % significance level; That is, the speculators in Dojima
could use all available information, and form a rational expectation. This period coincides
with the period when the abovementioned historical description was written. The recognition
held by traders at that time, that is, the futures prices were unbiased estimator of the future
spot prices, is now proved to be appropriate.
Ito (1993) rejected the UBH in the period from 1763 to 1780. It means that the efficiency
of Dojima, in terms of the rational expectation, was formed during the period from 1780 to
1835. Table 2 also indicates that the UBH in the period from 1840 to 1864 was rejected at
1 % significance level. The past literature, such as Miyamoto (1988), indicated that Dojima
in this period suffered from trading halts caused by some traders’ illegal trades. Hence, it
can be said that the rational expectation in Dojima was impaired by frequent trading halts
at this period.
Based on these results, we can conclude that the efficiency of Dojima, in terms of the
rational expectation, was proved in the middle of Tokugawa period. Because the rational
expectation is formed by the traders who reflect all available information into prices, Dojima,
in this period, could reflect all available information. According to Fama (1970), “A market
in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient’.” Thus, Dojima,
wrong figures.
10This index lacks closing prices of the futures market from 1857 to 1864. The opening price of the futures
market, however, was determined by the closing price in the previous day. Actually, there is no significant
difference between the closing price of the time t − 1 and the opening price of the time t; That is, the null
hypothesis; the closing price of the time t− 1 and the opening price of the time t are same in variance and
mean, was accepted in 1% significance level. Hence, I substitute the closing price of the time t − 1 for the
opening prices of the time t.
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in this period, indeed had this so called informational efficiency.
Then, how about another periods? Although the informational efficiency is one of the
significant necessary condition of the formation of the rational expectation, the reject of the
UBH in the end of Tokugawa period does not necessarily mean that Dojima, in this period,
did not have the informational efficiency. Ito (1993) and Wakita (2001) did not check this
point, precisely because of the lack of high-frequency price index. In the next section, we
look into this issue.
IV. Weak-form Efficiency
Market efficiency
The concept of market efficiency with respect not to resource allocation, but to some informa-
tion sets was first defined in a rigorous manner by Fama (1970). To check this informational
efficiency is equivalent to check how much, how fast, and how accurately available informa-
tion is incorporated into the prices. Financial economists often classify this informational
efficiency into three categories based on what is meant as “available information”; Namely,
the weak, semistrong, and strong forms. Among these criteria, this paper focuses on the
most objective criterion; the weak-form efficiency. The weak-form efficiency exists if the
prices fully reflect all the information contained in the history of past prices and returns. If
the markets have the weak-form efficiency, then the traders cannot earn excess profits from
trading rules based on the past price or return. Therefore, the returns of the investments
are not predictable.
The weak-form efficiency is the most basic, but most significant criterion, because if it
does not hold, then the semi-strong form or the strong form efficiency will never be satisfied.
Moreover, the past price sequences were assumed to be the most accessible information
for the traders in Dojima11. For these reasons, this paper start from this most objective
criterion.
A straightforward way to check the weak-form efficiency is to calculate autocorrelation
on the price sequences. If the price sequences at Dojima do not exhibit autocorrelation, we
can conclude that the traders at Dojima could not exploit the information from historical
price behaviors to obtain excess returns.
The test statistics
To test the market weak-form efficiency, this paper applies the Q-statistic proposed by Box
and Pierce (1970). This statistic is given by
Qm ≡ T
m∑
k=i
ρ2(k) (6)
11Recall that the “Yorozu souba nikki (Daily memorandum of commodity price indices)” was written by
the contemporary rice merchant.
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where the ρ(k) is the kth order autocorrelation coefficients, and the T is the sample number
of the price. Under the null hypothesis, ρ(k) = 0, ˆQm = T
∑m
k=i ρ
2(k) is asymptotically
distributed as χ2m. By summing the squared autocorrelations, the Box-Pierce Q-statistic is
designed to detect departures from zero autocorrelations in either directions and at all lags.
Based on this statistics, Ljung and Box (1978) provide the following finite-sample cor-
rection which yields a better fit to the χ2m for small sample sizes:
Q′m ≡ T (T + 2)
m∑
k=i
ρ2(k)
T − k . (7)
This paper calculates the Ljung and Box Q-statistics up to 5 lags, that is,
Q′5 ≡ T (T + 2)
5∑
k=i
ρ2(k)
T − k (8)
is calculated. The null hypothesis is offered as H0 : ρ(k) = 0, ∀k ≤ 5.
The results
The results of the tests are shown in Table 3. As Table 3 indicates, the null hypotheses in
the spot market can not be rejected in about 80% of all periods, and those in the futures
market can not be rejected in about 70% of all. Based on these results, we can conclude
that both markets succeeded in reflecting the past price sequences accurately. In addition,
as Table 4 indicates, there does not exist any patterns; That is, the weak-form efficiency is
detected uniformly, and even in the end of the Tokugawa period when Dojima suffered from
frequent trading halts. On the other hand, Table 5 indicates that the weak-form efficiency
was detected more frequently in the winter market, when newly harvested rice came on
the market. This indicates the liquidity level of supply, which was lower in the spring and
summer market, and was higher in the winter market, could affected the trade activity in
Dojima.
Concluding Remarks
It has been shown that Dojima had succeeded in forming the rational expectation in the
middle of Tokugawa period, and it had the weak-form efficiency in the whole periods. The
efficiency of Dojima, which was not detected by the previous works, but was observed by
the contemporary traders, has been verified here.
Finding these type of efficiency at Dojima is surprising to us, because these does not nec-
essarily hold even in contemporary modern financial markets equipped with the information
and communication technology12.
12The UBH has been rejected by many empirical works; Fama (1984), Baillie and Myers (1991), Bessler
and Covey (1991), and Chowdhury (1991), which cover the various commodity futures market. The weak-
form efficiency do not also necessarily hold in the contemporary financial markets. Lo and MacKinlay (1988)
find that weekly returns on portfolios of NYSE stocks grouped according to size show reliable positive
autocorrelation. See Fama (1991) for an elaboration of these issues.
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Actually, this paper only showed the weak-form efficiency, and the semi-strong or strong
form efficiency is remained to be unanswered. These are left as a challenging task for future
inquiry.
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Table 1. The trading rules in Dojima
Futures Market Spot Market
Goods in trades he standard rice (index The rice bills
Trading priods January 4-April 27 January 4-April 28
May 7-October 8 May 7-October 9
ctober 17-December 2 October 17-December 24
Trading time From 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. From 10 a.m. to the noon
Trading system Open-Out-Cry Open-Out-Cry
Settlement Net settlement Delivery within 4 days
Table 2. Results of the test of the UBH
Period 1798-1864 1798-1835 1840-1864
α -13.430 -5.078 -2.145
β 1.266 1.076 1.175
R-squared 0.783 0.570 0.723
F-value 22.994 0.269 17.071
P-value 0.000 0.765 0.000
D.W. 2.067 2.199 2.199
Table 3. Results of the Q-tests
periods Futures Spot periods Futures Spot periods Futures Spot periods Futures Spot
1798-1 Y Y 1810-1 Y Y 1841-1 N Y 1854-1 Y Y
1798-2 Y N 1810-2 Y Y 1841-2 N Y 1854-2 Y Y
1798-3 Y Y 1810-3 Y Y 1841-3 N Y 1854-3 Y N
1799-1 Y Y 1811-1 Y N 1842-1 N Y 1855-1 Y Y
1799-2 N Y 1811-2 Y Y 1842-2 N Y 1855-2 N Y
1799-3 Y Y 1811-3 Y Y 1842-3 Y Y 1855-3 Y Y
1800-1 N N 1812-1 Y Y 1843-1 N N 1856-1 Y Y
1800-2 N Y 1812-2 Y Y 1843-2 N Y 1856-2 Y Y
1800-3 Y Y 1812-3 Y Y 1843-3 Y N 1856-3 N Y
1801-1 Y Y 1813-1 Y Y 1844-1 N Y 1857-1 Y Y
1801-2 Y Y 1813-2 N Y 1844-2 Y N 1857-2 Y Y
1801-3 Y Y 1813-3 N Y 1844-3 Y Y 1857-3 Y Y
1802-1 Y Y 1814-1 Y Y 1845-1 Y Y 1858-1 Y Y
1802-2 N Y 1814-2 N Y 1845-2 Y Y 1858-2 Y Y
1802-3 Y Y 1814-3 Y N 1845-3 Y Y 1858-3 Y Y
1803-1 Y Y 1815-1 Y N 1846-1 Y Y 1859-1 Y Y
1803-2 N Y 1815-2 Y Y 1846-2 Y N 1859-2 Y Y
1803-3 Y Y 1815-3 Y Y 1846-3 Y Y 1859-3 Y Y
1804-1 Y Y 1816-1 N Y 1847-1 Y Y 1860-1 Y Y
1804-2 N N 1816-2 Y Y 1847-2 N N 1860-2 Y Y
1804-3 Y Y 1816-3 Y Y 1847-3 Y Y 1860-3 N Y
1805-1 Y Y 1817-1 N N 1848-1 N N 1861-1 Y N
1805-2 Y Y 1817-2 N N 1848-2 Y N 1861-2 Y Y
1805-3 N Y 1817-3 Y N 1848-3 Y N 1861-3 Y Y
1806-1 Y Y 1818-1 Y Y 1850-1 N Y 1862-1 N Y
1806-2 Y Y 1818-2 Y Y 1850-2 N Y 1862-2 N Y
1806-3 Y N 1818-3 Y Y 1850-3 N Y 1862-3 Y Y
1807-1 Y Y 1834-1 Y N 1851-1 Y Y 1863-1 N N
1807-2 N Y 1834-2 Y Y 1851-2 N Y 1863-2 N Y
1807-3 Y Y 1834-3 Y Y 1851-3 Y Y 1863-3 Y Y
1808-1 Y Y 1835-1 Y Y 1852-1 Y Y 1864-1 N Y
1808-2 Y Y 1835-2 Y Y 1852-2 Y N 1864-2 Y N
1808-3 N Y 1835-3 Y Y 1852-3 Y N 1864-3 Y Y
1809-1 Y Y 1840-1 N Y 1853-1 N N
1809-2 Y Y 1840-2 Y N 1853-2 Y Y Note)
1809-3 N Y 1840-3 Y Y 1853-3 Y Y ?The numbers attached to the years, namely 1834-1, 1834-2 and 1834-3
   indicates spring, summer, winter market respectively.
?The column "Efficiency" is "Y" when the null hypotheses are not
  rejected in 5% significance level, and is "N" otherwise.
Table 4. Pattens of the Q-tests results in each period
periods Futures Spot
1798-1864 71.6% 80.9%
1798-1835 76.8% 84.1%
1840-1864 66.7% 77.8%
Note)
?The percentages were calculated by dividing the number of the periods
  in which the null hypotheses are not rejected, by the number of the period in total.
Table 5. Seasonal pattens of the Q-tests results
Spring market Summer market Winter market
periods Futures Spot periods Futures Spot periods Futures Spot
1798-1864 70.2% 78.7% 1798-1864 61.7% 78.7% 1798-1864 83.0% 85.1%
1798-1835 87.0% 78.3% 1798-1835 60.9% 87.0% 1798-1835 82.6% 87.0%
1840-1864 54.2% 79.2% 1840-1864 62.5% 70.8% 1840-1864 83.3% 83.3%
Note)
?The percentages were calculated by dividing the number of the periods
  in which the null hypotheses are not rejected, by the number of the period in total.
